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1. Introduction
The collective approach to household behavior is gradually gaining ground in the applied
microeconomic literature. Introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992), and Apps and Rees
(1988), this approach can be seen as a substantial improvement over the standard, or
unitary, model of household behavior. On the one hand, the model generalizes the unitary
approach to a multi utility framework while nesting all other cooperative models leading to
efficiency. On the other hand, it allows to derive original restrictions which are rarely
rejected on observed behavior of individuals in couples, whereas tests of the unitary
approach usually come to the opposite conclusion.
However, there is yet no simple way to identify and estimate a collective model of labor
supply to perform satisfying simulations of tax benefit reform, i.e., in a setting which
incorporates both participation decisions (in addition to the choice of work hours) and
realistic nonconvex budget sets arising from means tested social and family benefits. These
features are hard to handle by usual means.1
The present paper suggests a methodology to calibrate a collective model of labor
supply with household specific bargaining rules and marriage specific preferences that
incorporate leisure externalities. The empirical identification relies on the assumption that
some aspects of individual preferences but not all remain the same after marriage, so
that some parameters can be separately estimated on a sample of single individuals. The
main novelty of the approach lies in a calibration procedure to map the complete Pareto
frontier of each household in the dataset. Alternative measures of the final location on the
frontier are interpreted as power indices. One of the latter is then regressed on relevant
bargaining factors, including a set of variables retracing the potential relative contributions
of the spouses to household disposable income (i.e., income after social contributions,
taxes and benefits). In this way, tax reforms not only directly change the budget constraint,
as in the unitary model, but also potentially alter the balance of power in the household by
changing the potential relative contributions of each spouse.
In its capacity to handle nonconvex budget sets and labor force participation decisions
of both spouses, this model offers a unique chance to compare behavioral responses to tax
reform simulations by the two competing approaches, namely the unitary and the collective
representations. This is the purpose of the following papers, Myck et al. (2006) and
Beninger et al. (2006).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a precise description of the Pareto
allocations in the collective setting considered here. Section 3 describes the steps in the
calibration procedure. These include the estimation of preference parameters for singles, as
well as the calibration of leisure interaction coefficients, one for each spouse, and of a
‘‘power’’ index. Section 4 concludes, while the Appendix provides further details
regarding the specification and estimation methods.
1 Within the collective approach, Beninger (2000) and Donni (2003) provide theoretical results for the case
of convex budget sets. Moreau and Donni (2002) estimate a household labor supply model for France
accordingly, by convexifying the budget sets and selecting participating couples. On the other hand,
Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir (2001) tackle nonparticipation with linear budget constraints. But
the general case has not yet received proper treatment.
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2. Pareto efficient household allocations
We focus on households consisting of two working age individuals (for simplicity they
will be referred to as the spouses, although they need not be married), with their dependent
children. If present, the latter are assumed to have no bargaining power in the household,
and their preferences are supposed to be internalized by the parents.2 Individual prefer
ences are represented by the direct utility functions:
ui vi ci; lm; lf ; d
 
; i m; f ; ð1Þ
defined over a Hicksian consumption aggregate ci, and leisure amounts lm and lf as
arguments, and parameterized by a vector d of demographic characteristics like number of
children and education level. These utility functions are assumed to be increasing and
concave in own consumption and leisure. They allow for an externality with respect to the
other individual’s leisure. Externalities with respect to consumption and household public
goods (e.g., rent) are excluded because in the given setting we cannot identify which
expenditures are for public consumption and which expenditures have external effects.3
To finance total consumption, c, the household has limited resources
c cm þ cf  g ‘m; ‘f ;wm;wf ; y; d ; ð2Þ
where ci, wi and ‘i=T ) li are, respectively, individual i’s consumption, gross wage rate and
labor supply (with T the individual’s time endowment). Total nonlabor income, y, is
composed of (possibly) individually assignable nonlabor incomes ym and yf and some other
nonlabor income yh. Finally, the function g represents the way in which the tax benefit
system to which we henceforth refer simply as the tax system generates disposable
income from these ingredients, including some household demographic characteristics.
A household allocation (cm, cf, lm, lf) is Pareto efficient if it is a solution to the following
maximization problem:
max
cm;cf ;lm;lf
vm cm; lm; lf ; d
 
subject to the budget constraint (2) and to
vf cf ; lm; lf ; d
   uf ; ð3Þ
where uf is some required utility level for the female. By varying uf , the set of Pareto
efficient allocations can be traced out. The required utility level uf captures the outcome of
intrahousehold negotiation, and, hence, depends on relative wages, nonlabor incomes and
distribution factors. This level of utility also depends on the overall productivity of the
household.
Note that in the case of convex utility possibility sets (obtained when utility functions
are strongly concave and budget sets are convex; see, e.g., Mas Colell, Whinston, & Green,
1995), the above maximization problem is equivalent to the maximization of a weighted
2 Dauphin, El Laga, Fortin, and Lacroix (2006) test for the number of decision makers in a study on
consumption within the setting of Browning and Chiappori (1998).
3 Examples of collective models with more general preferences can be found in Browning and Chiappori
(1998) and Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002).
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mean of individual utilities, with weights that are functions of wages, nonlabor income and
distribution factors. This dependence is the main distinction between the collective setting
and the unitary model where preferences are independent from wages and nonlabor income
(for a precise statement, see Browning, Chiappori, & Lechene, 2006).
3. Empirical specification and identification of the collective labor supply model
There are several applications of collective labor supply models in the literature. In Fortin
and Lacroix (1997), Chiappori et al. (2002), Moreau and Donni (2002), and Vermeulen
(2005), collective models of labor supply are estimated for two earner households. In all
these papers both spouses’ labor supplies are assumed to be flexible. This is a serious problem
that has only been partially tackled for the case where the male’s labor supply is rigid.
Blundell et al. (2001) introduce nonparticipation and unobserved preference heterogeneity,
under the assumption of constant marginal tax rates. Budget constraints resulting in convex
budget sets are considered by Donni (2003). These are important improvements in the
application of the collective setting, but they are not completely satisfactory for our purposes.
As already mentioned, we introduce both nonparticipation and nonlinear income tax
ation in our setting. This may result in nonconvex budget sets and thus in nonconvex utility
possibility sets, which rules out a weighted utilities approach (see above). A first char
acteristic of our approach is that the labor supply of both spouses will be treated as discrete.
This assumption eases econometric problems related to nonconvex budget sets and has
proven useful in the unitary setting (see, for instance, Bingley & Walker, 1997; van Soest,
1995). Taking wages, nonlabor incomes, household characteristics, and the tax system as
given, total household consumption can be calculated for each combination of the indi
viduals’ labor supplies.
However, the identification of a discrete choice collective model (i.e., of individual
preferences and of the decision process) with nonconvex utility possibility sets and exter
nalities, from observed couples’ labor supplies alone, is, if achievable at all, beyond the scope
of the present work. Therefore, a second characteristic of our approach is that the model is
identified in a piecemeal way, making use of information obtained by econometric estima
tions, as well as information coming from a calibration exercise. The crucial identifying
assumption is the similarity of individuals’ preferences before and after marriage. For the
simpler case of two earner households and linearized budget restrictions, this approach is also
followed by Barmby and Smith (2001). Manser and Brown (1980) even assume that pref
erences do not change as a result of the formation of a new household.4 Indeed, the (egoistic)
utility functions for both spouses are taken to be independent of marital status. In this way, the
authors can easily define threat points. As will be seen below, here both individual utility
functions change after marriage with the addition of a leisure interaction term.
3.1. Specification of the individual utility functions
We now translate the Pareto optimality problem (3) in an empirically tractable form. First,
the individual utility functions vm and vf are assumed to be of the following form (i=m, f
and i „ j):
4 An alternative approach can be found in Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2004), who assume that
singles and individuals in couples have the same preferences over a bundle of private good equivalents. For
singles, private good equivalents equal observed quantities. For couples, a household consumption tech
nology transforms observed quantities into private good equivalents.
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vi ci; li; lj; d
 
bic dð Þ ln ci cðdÞ
 þ bilðdÞ ln li lðdÞ
 
þ diðdÞ ln li lðdÞ  ln lj lðdÞ : ð4Þ
The utility functions are seen to consist of two parts. First, a part corresponding to the
familiar linear expenditure system (LES), where the preference parameters cðdÞ and lðdÞ
capture ‘‘subsistence’’ or minimum consumption and leisure which are allowed to depend
on household characteristics d. In particular, all time not spent in the market is interpreted
as leisure, but the term lðdÞ is assumed to consist of time required for regeneration and for
essential caring tasks when there are children in the household. Second, the utility func
tions include a leisure interaction term that accounts for potential complementarity in
spouses’ leisure or any other interaction between them. The introduction of this term
relaxes the strong assumption of separability of individual preferences usually made in the
empirical literature on collective models.5 However, as already mentioned, this setting
does not allow for externalities with respect to consumption. Finally, individual i’s utility
function is strictly increasing and quasi concave in own consumption ci and own leisure li,
if the following conditions are satisfied (i=m, f and i „ j):
bicðdÞ[0; and diðdÞ[ bilðdÞ= ln lj lðdÞ
 
: ð5Þ
This setting basically interprets all time not spent on the labor market as leisure,
although we do put some effort in deducting from non market time some time require
ments related to the demographic structure of the household (see next section). Naturally, it
would clearly be desirable to model shared leisure, the presence of children and household
production in an explicit way.6 We reach the usual limits of the literature here. In par
ticular, the distinction between pure leisure and nonmarket time as an input in the
household production process is difficult in the absence of adequate data (time use data
containing also household characteristics and incomes).7 Note, however, that recent find
ings in Donni (2004) show that (i) simple functional forms which are consistent with the
traditional collective model of labor supply can sometimes be compatible with more
sophisticated models incorporating domestic production, (ii) if the domestic good is
marketable, these models can be tested and partially identified using traditional household
surveys (i.e., without resort to time allocation surveys).
We now turn to the problem of identifying the parameters bc
i (d), bl
i (d) and di (d) (i=m,
f) from observed labor supplies and household aggregate consumption, given the mix of
effects coming from individual preferences and an intrahousehold bargaining process that
is reflected in uf (see condition (3)).
3.2. Identification of the LES parameters of individual preferences
A crucial assumption made here is that the LES parameters bc
i (d) and bl
i (d) (i=m, f) can be
identified on the basis of a sample of single males and females. This assumption, which
5 Browning and Chiappori (1998) is an exception, but their paper is not primarily concerned with labor
supply and focuses on linear budget constraits. See also Chiappori et al. (2002).
6 Apps and Rees (2001) present a model with household production that also includes a calibration step. The
theoretical distinction between individual and shared leisure in a collective framework is investigated by
Fong and Zhang (2001). Apps (2003) discusses the limitations of time use surveys in this context.
7 See Browning and Gørtz (2005) for an empirical study taking advantage of such data.
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implies that, apart from a leisure interaction term, singles and individuals in couples have
the same preferences, ceteris paribus, is of course questionable, but it is not totally unre
alistic. Moreover, it should be stressed that, in so far as singles and married individuals can
have different marginal rates of substitution between own leisure and consumption, they can
have different reactions to tax reforms. Proceeding in a piecemeal way, as announced, we
estimate the parameters bc
i (d) and bl
i (d) separately, using two samples of single males and
single females. But ultimately, simultaneous estimation using data concerning single and
married males and females would be desirable, as it would lead to efficiency gains.
Although the minimum consumption and leisure cðdÞ and lðdÞ can in principle be
estimated, for simplicity we choose to calibrate them on the basis of published time use
data and social minima for the different countries.8 This information is typically available
for different demographic compositions of the household.
For instance, for the UK, the National Statistics Omnibus Survey time use module
indicates that the average regeneration time for childless singles under pension age is
10.1 h per day for women and 9.7 for men. For Germany, corresponding figures for
childless singles (drawn from the German Time Budget Survey 1991/1992, see Beblo,
2001) are 10.2 h of daily physiological regeneration and almost 3.3 h for housework for
women (10 and 2.4 for men).
In the presence of children, some additional time requirements need to be taken into
account. For France, this information is obtained from the 1998 INSEE Time Allocation
Survey. An additional weekly time requirement is set according to the age of the youngest
child. For the wife and the husband this equals, respectively, 14 and 7 h if at least one child
is below age 5, 6 and 3 h if at least one child is between 6 and 11, 5 and 2 h if at least one
child older than 11. For German couples (see Beblo, 2001), the additional time requirement
for a full time working man is 0.8 h per day, if he is living together with at least one child
up to age 6. For a full time working woman this rise in household demands amounts to
about 2 h. For older children, i.e., if all children are aged between 7 and 12, 0.4 h per day
are added to the father’s minimum ‘‘leisure’’ and 1 h per day to the mother’s.
3.3. Identification of leisure interaction terms and bargaining power
The leisure interaction terms dm (d) and df (d) and the female’s required, or negotiated,
level of utility uf remain to be identified. If the Pareto frontier were concave to the origin
(or the utility possibility set were convex), the optimal choice of hours could be obtained
by maximizing a household social welfare function defined as a convex combination of
individual utility functions. However, as a consequence of the nonconvexity of many
budget sets, the utility possibility sets of many households turn out not to be convex (this
concerns 42% of the households in Beninger et al., 2006). Thus, in order to capture all
behavior possibilities, we must adopt another approach. The chosen procedure consists of
determining each household’s Pareto frontier and, for given preference parameters,
searching for that point of the frontier which best corresponds to observed behavior.
3.3.1. Pareto frontier and identification of the bargaining power
Let us now describe the calibration procedure. Given the two observed labor supplies we
can identify two parameters at the household level. Therefore, we first restrict attention to
8 This is also what Barmby and Smith (2001) do.
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the identification of the bargaining power and a common leisure interaction term. The idea
is the following: for each household and for each element of a discrete set of values (d, d)
for the leisure interaction terms (dm (d), df (d)), chosen identical for both spouses, a
discrete set of Pareto efficient allocations is calculated. An allocation from this set is
singled out on the basis of the best fit with observed labor supplies. This serves to identify
the corresponding bargaining power parameter. In a subsequent stage, individual leisure
interaction terms dm and df are identified on the basis of a parametric specification,
common to all households, for the woman’s bargaining power.
For each household, the algorithm used in practice is the following.
1. For each d2{dmin,...,dmax}, where d=dm (d)=df (d), define the utility level umaxf (d) as
the value of the woman’s utility when she receives a maximum share of total
household consumption (set, e.g., to 90% for Germany), and the leisure amounts lm
and lf are chosen under condition (5) in such a way that her utility is maximal. Denote
umin
m (d) the corresponding utility level achieved by the man. The other extreme [umax
m
(d), umin
f (d)] is defined symmetrically. Thus, the points with coordinates [umin
m (d),
umax
f (d)] and [umax
m (d), umin
f (d)] can be considered as the boundaries (dictatorial
positions) of the Pareto frontier for each value of the common preference parameter d.
2. Define K utility levels uk
f (d)=umin
f (d)+(k/K)[umax
f (d) ) umin
f (d)], where k=0,...,K. Note
that the boundaries of the Pareto frontier are obtained for k=0 and k=K.
3. For each k, choose the labor supplies in their respective choice sets, Di, i=f, m, so that
the man maximizes his utility subject to the household budget constraint and her
required utility level:
max
cm;cf ;lm;lf
vm cm; lm; lf ; d; d
  ð6Þ
subject to
vf cf ; lm; lf ; d; d
   ufk dð Þ;
cm þ cf  g ‘m; ‘f ;wm;wf ; y; d ;
‘i 2 Di; i m; f :
This maximization procedure results in an optimal labor supply and consumption
bundle [‘m(d,k), ‘f(d,k), cm(d,k), cf(d,k)] for each k.
4. Given d, choose in the discrete set of Pareto efficient allocations the one that mini
mizes the criterion
k ‘mðd; kÞ ‘mo
 2þ ‘f ðd; kÞ ‘fo
 2 ð7Þ
over k, where ‘o
i (i=m,f) is individual i’s observed labor supply, and k is chosen in order
to avoid dissymmetry in the fit for males and females (male labor supply is typically
more concentrated).9 This step results in an optimal labor supply and consumption
9 In a full estimation approach, k would be estimated in a two stage procedure like feasible generalized least
squares. Here it is only roughly calibrated ex ante, with the main aim of taking into account different
discretizations of labor supplies of men and women, as well as different hours distributions.
1 7
allocation [‘*
m(d),‘*
f (d),c*
m(d),c*
f (d)] for each couple of individual utility functions
vm(.;d) and vf(.;d). If there are multiple allocations that minimize the above criterion,
then the allocation minimizing the difference between the consumption levels of the
spouses is selected. This step results in the choice of an allocation indexed by k*(d).
5. Over all individual preferences characterized by d, choose the value d* that minimizes
criterion (7) with ‘*
i (d) in place of ‘i(d,k*(d)).
Given the above procedure, a measure for the female’s bargaining power in the
interval [0,1] can be defined as
lf k dð Þ=K: ð8Þ
This is simply a parameterization of the household’s location on the Pareto frontier;
the nearer this number is to one, the nearer the woman is to her dictatorial position
[umin
m (d),umax
f (d)], and thus the higher is her bargaining power. A symmetric parameteri
zation can be based on the same algorithm with the genders permuted, and this leads to a
measure lm for his bargaining power. If the Pareto frontier were a straight segment, lf
and lm would add up to one, but if it were a portion of a circle, then their squares would add
up to one instead. This motivates a second measure which depends on the local curvature of
the Pareto frontier at the chosen point. Define the female’s bargaining power as
xf l
a
f ; ð9Þ
where a is the solution to
laf þ lam 1: ð10Þ
This measure yields more meaningful comparisons across households than the first one
because it takes account of the shape of the Pareto frontier which varies across households.
As an alternative, we could calibrate uk
f (d) directly, as Bargain, Beninger, Laisney, and
Moreau (2002) do, and normalize the female utility scale by the multiplicative factor c=
P
um/
P
uf, so as to equalize wives’ and husbands’ utilities on average. Her utility becomes c
uf so that the sum of normalized female utilities over the population equals the sum of male
utilities. Using calibrated values, we then suggest a third index for the female bargaining
power whose interpretation is rather straightforward:
-f
cuf
cuf þ um
: ð11Þ
Note that the above proposed measures of an individual’s bargaining power are not
insensitive to the choice of the cardinalization. The index -f is clearly invariant to
(identical) linear transformation (scaling) of the spouses’ utilities, while some algebra
shows that the index xf is invariant to affine transformations with identical slopes for both
spouses. The characterization of measures of bargaining power that would be robust to the
choice of cardinalization is still on our research agenda. An interesting avenue for future
research may be the derivation of money metric measures of bargaining power. This
approach, however, is not straightforward in a discrete setting and may become even more
complicated within a collective model (see Bhattarai & Whalley, 1997; Browning et al.,
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2004; Small & Rosen, 1981, within a decentralized continuous collective model with a
household consumption technology).
The next step in the calibration exercise consists of a logistic regression of the bar
gaining power index on a number of variables. Generally, the bargaining power is sup
posed to depend on wages, prices, nonlabor income and distribution factors. However, as
mentioned by Browning and Lechene (2001), the theory of the collective model does not
give precise guidance as to which variables should be included in the set of distribution
factors. But the empirical literature has highlighted some exogenous factors which
potentially influence bargaining power. Estimations usually concern the sharing rule in
decentralized collective models.10 We can think of socio demographic characteristics of
the household such as (i) the allocation of child benefits among spouses, (ii) the age
difference between the spouses, (iii) the difference in education level (under the
assumption that human capital decisions are exogenous), and (iv) regional indicators that
may pick up cultural differences or differences in sex ratios. The amount of unearned
income brought independently by each spouse may also be crucial.11
Since we are primarily concerned with the effect of taxation in a collective setting, it
seems appropriate to include a distribution factor related to the relative earnings of the
spouses, or rather to their relative earning potential. Gross wage rates are clearly not
attractive, because they do not change with the reforms at stake. Net wages are not
attractive either because the theory of the collective model imposes the exogeneity of the
distribution factors. Still, some measure summarizing the way in which the tax system
potentially modifies the relative net earnings of the spouses can be included. In the
empirical exercise, the female’s and male’s marginal contributions to the household’s
earnings when switching from the lowest labor supply choice to the highest are opted for.
Specifically, we consider two such variables, yd
40 and yd
20 defined as follows. Let pf
j and pm
j
denote the observed sample frequencies of (discretized) weekly labor supplies ‘j of wives
and husbands, respectively. Denote Rmj
fj¢ the household disposable income when the hus
band works ‘j hours and the wife works ‘j¢ hours. Variable yf
40 defined as:
y40f
XJ
j 1
pjm R
f 40
mj R
f 0
mj
 
ð12Þ
measures the expected increase in the household disposable income if the wife switches
from 0 to 40 h, the expectation being taken over the males’ hours distribution. Defining yf
20
and ym
40 similarly, we then consider the two ratios yd
40=yf
40/ym
40 and yd
20=yf
20/ym
40 which we
term ‘‘relative earning power’’ of the wife at 40 h (resp. 20).
In view of the above discussion, let e be a vector of explanatory variables that do not
belong to the vector of household characteristics d, but that are assumed to affect spouses’
bargaining power (relative earning power, assignable nonlabor incomes, etc.). The esti
mated bargaining power index is then denoted by xf(e, d). The cross sectional variation in
potential relative earnings identifies the effect of the tax system on the power index.12
Note, however, that our indicator of relative earning power does not allow to distinguish
10 For instance, using the PSID, Chiappori et al. (2002) find a significant impact on the sharing rule of the
sex ratio and the divorce laws across states for US households.
11 Indeed, the hypothesis of income pooling specific to the unitary model, but relaxed by the collective
model, is rejected by most tests in the empirical literature on collective models already quoted.
12 Clearly, a more reliable identification could be obtained by using data covering a tax reform along the
lines of Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998).
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between different types of tax benefit instruments generating an identical change in
earning capacity. The role of these tax benefit instruments may be different in the nego
tiation and, hence, the nature of a reform can be important. A targeted reform with a
‘‘gender tag’’ as in Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) may have a stronger influence
on household behavior than a reform of income taxation in a country with joint taxation
(see Donni, 2003, for a more general discussion).
3.3.2. Identification of the leisure interaction terms
Once we have obtained an estimated bargaining power index for each household, the above
algorithm is redefined to include this xf(e, d) and two different leisure interaction terms,
one for each spouse.
1. First, for each pair (dm,df) with di2{dmini ,...,dmaxi }, and i=m, f, calculate umaxf (dm,df) and
umin
f (dm,df) in the same way as before.
2. Define K utility levels
ufk d
m; df
 
ufmin d
m; df
 þ k=Kð Þ ufmax dm; df
 
ufmin d
m; df
 h i
; ð13Þ
where k=0,...,K. Choose from this set the required utility level ufk d
m; df
 
such that k*
is the integer nearest to xf(e,d)
1/aK.13
3. Solve the following Pareto optimality problem:
max
cm;cf ;lm;lf
vm cm; lm; lf ; d; dm
  ð14Þ
subject to
vf cf ; lf ; lm; d; df
   ufk dm; df
 
;
c cm þ cf  g ‘m; ‘f ;wm;wf ; y; d ;
‘i 2 Di; i m; f :
For each pair of utility functions, this results in an optimal labor supply and con
sumption bundle
‘m dm; df
 
; ‘f dm; df
 
; cm dm; df
 
; cf dm; df
  
: ð15Þ
4. Choose the individual utility functions, defined by dm and df, that minimize the cri
terion
k ‘m dm; df
 
‘mo
 2þ ‘f dm; df  ‘fo
 2
: ð16Þ
Again, in the case of multiple solutions select the solution entailing the smallest
discrepancy between the consumption levels of the spouses.
13 Recall the definition of lf in equation (8).
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5. Finally, the calibrated dm and df parameters are regressed on a set of household
characteristics. Estimated parameters, say dm(d) and df(d), close the model.14
At the end of the exercise we have at our disposal a set of ‘‘collective’’ parameters
which allow to predict labor supplies by means of the identified collective model and
conditional on observed and imputed gross wages, household characteristics and the tax
system. In this way, we can generate a ‘‘collective’’ dataset which forms the baseline for
(i) welfare analysis of tax reforms with a collective model, and (ii) estimation of a unitary
model for quantification of the distortions in welfare analysis associated with the use of a
unitary model in a collective world (see Myck et al., 2006; Beninger et al., 2006).
The Appendix gives further details on the estimation procedures used and empirical
results are available for different countries in Bargain et al. (2002, France), Beninger,
Laisney, and Beblo (2002, Germany), Blundell, Lechene, and Myck (2002, UK), Carrasco
and Ruiz Castillo (2002, Spain), Chiuri and Longobardi (2002, Italy), and Vermeulen
(2002, Belgium).
4. Conclusion
Despite very important theoretical advancements in the modeling of labor supply of
individuals in couples in the recent decade, there are few empirical applications of the
collective model. Accounting simultaneously for nonparticipation, nonconvex budget sets
and nonegoistic preferences present difficulties which have not yet been overcome by usual
identification and estimation techniques. This may explain why the unitary model has
remained the favored model in practical applications for the purpose of fiscal reform
analysis.
The aim of this methodological paper was to present an alternative approach to
implement a collective model in the presence of nonconvex budget sets, nonparticipation
and individual preferences accounting for possible complementarity in spouses’ leisures.
The methodology is original in that it provides a way to map the complete Pareto frontier
of each household in the dataset using calibration. Identification relies on the estimation of
preference parameters on samples of male and female singles, assuming some persistence
in consumption leisure preferences, and on the calibration of the bargaining outcome and
marriage specific preference parameters on observed labor supplies of individuals in
couples.
In its capacity to handle nonconvex budget sets and labor force participation decisions
of both spouses, this model allows to simulate realistic tax reforms and to account for their
impact not only on budget constraints but also on the balance of power in the household.
This is the purpose of the following paper of the current issue, Myck et al. In addition, the
model allows to compare unitary and collective representations. More specifically, a
unitary model can be estimated on collective behavior (labor supplies predicted by the
collective model). Subsequently, behavioral responses of this unitary model can be com
pared to those of the correct collective model, to gauge the discrepancies due to the
14 One could think of iterating the procedure further, by re calibrating the bargaining power position given
the estimated dm(d) and df(d) until convergence, but this would be costly in terms of computer time.
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wrongful unitary assumption. This is the topic of the last paper in the current issue,
Beninger et al.15
In addition to familiar limitations (limited account of children, absence of domestic
production, purely private consumption), the construction of the collective model pre
sented here relies on a piecemeal approach that mixes estimation and calibration proce
dures. An obvious next step is to use the same identification assumptions with a pure
estimation strategy.
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Appendix
For the sake of completeness we give here some details on the estimation procedures used.
A.1 Wage equations
In order to obtain wage rates for the whole population, including those not working, we
estimate wage equations.
For singles we posit a linear normal selection model and use either the maximum
likelihood method or the two steps Heckman procedure. We tried a number of different
estimation methods, including also two step methods with other regressors than the pre
dicted normal hazard used in the Heckman approach, but the choices mentioned above
gave the most accurate predictions for working singles.
For couples we also estimate wage equations separately for wives and husbands. The
following conceptual difficulty arises here due to selectivity: a participation model would
need to be based on the collective framework, which is difficult. However, Lewbel (2000)
proposes an estimation method for the selection model which does not require the speci
fication of the selection mechanism.16 The method relies on the existence of a variable
which is monotonically related to the selection variable: in the case of participation,
household unearned income is a plausible candidate though admittedly less so in the
collective than in the unitary approach, because of the effect of household unearned
income on intrahousehold allocation. We use the simplest of the estimators proposed by
Lewbel for wives. For men we apply OLS, as the selectivity problem is much less severe
for them, and the OLS predictions are more accurate than those based on the Lewbel
estimator.
15 Although we proceed in a fairly naive way by treating the collective model as deterministic in Beninger
et al., there is scope for full scale simulation taking into account all types of unobserved heterogeneity
considered in the estimation/calibration approach, as well as the uncertainty embodied in the estimated
parameters. This concerns the estimation of wages for the nonparticipants, the estimation of preference
parameters for singles, and the estimation/calibration of xf(e, d), d
m(d) and df(d).
16 We would like to thank Costas Meghir for pointing this out.
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A.2 Preferences of single women and men
We estimate preferences separately for women and men, assuming LES type preferences:
vi ci; lið Þ bic ln ci cið Þ þ bil ln li li
 
i f ;m; ð17Þ
where ci represents consumption (i.e., disposable income in this static model) and li de
mand for leisure. ci and li are, respectively the ‘‘minimum’’ requirements in consumption
and leisure. Instead of estimating these, which proved difficult, we chose to calibrate them.
The budget constraint is defined as:
ci g li;wi; yi;/ið Þ i f ;m; ð18Þ
where wi and yi are, respectively i’s gross wage rate and i’s unearned income, /i represents
a vector of characteristics relevant to the tax system, and the function g expresses the tax
benefit schedule.
For the estimation, we use a mixed multinomial logit model (MMNL) with mass points
on the consumption and leisure coefficients in order to account for unobserved heteroge
neity (see Heckman and Singer, 1984; Hoynes, 1996).17 We suppose that each person has J
alternative values ‘j for his/her weekly labor supply, leading to leisure choices lj=T)‘j,
where T is the total time available in a week: 168 h a week. The contribution to the
likelihood for person i choosing combination (ci
j, lj) is:
L
XR
r 1
pr
exp bicr ln c
j
i ci
 þ bilr ln lj li
  
PJ
j0 1 exp b
i
cr ln c
j0
i ci
 
þ bilr log lj0 li
 h i ð19Þ
where R denotes the number of mass points (or regimes), and pr the probability associated
with mass point r in the mixture. Three mass points appear sufficient, given the heavy
dominance of one of the regimes for both preference estimations, single women as well as
single men. We do not impose the constraint bc
i +bl
i 1 in the estimation, but check that the
estimates are positive, which allows to rescale the utility function by bc
i +bl
i afterwards. An
alternative specification with bc
i F(zic), where F denotes the logistic cumulative distri
bution function, and zic a linear index depending on characteristics for individual i, used
for instance by Hoynes (1996), led to much lower likelihood values. The reason for the
superiority of not imposing the restriction bcr
i +blr
i 1 is that it amounts to fixing the scale
of utility. The MMNL model results from adding iid error terms to (17) for each possible
choice, with an extreme value distribution. This entails a fixed variance, which in turns
identifies the scale of utility (and thus the sum of the marginal valuations of leisure and
consumption).
In order to ensure that the probabilities pr do lie between 0 and 1, we adopt the
following logit parameterization:
17 We also estimated random parameter logit models (RPL, see, e.g., McFadden and Train, 2000) with a
normal distribution of the constant terms in bc
i and bl
i. For several countries we obtained significant dis
persion for the consumption term, but not for the leisure term, both for men and women. The specification
with mass points on bc
i alone strongly dominated the RPL specification on most cases, both in terms of
likelihood and in terms of accuracy of predictions.
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pr expðerÞ= 1 þ
PR 1
s 1
expðesÞ
 
; r 1; . . . ;R 1;
pR 1
PR 1
s 1
ps:
ð20Þ
After estimation, we allocate each observation to the regime yielding the best hours
prediction.
References
Apps, P. (2003). Gender, time use and models of the household. IZA Discussion Paper 796. Bonn: IZA.
Apps, P., & Rees, R. (1988). Taxation and the household. Journal of Public Economics, 35, 355 369.
Apps, P., & Rees, R. (2001). Household production, full consumption and the costs of children. Labour
Economics, 8, 621 648.
Bargain, O., Beninger, D., Laisney, F., & Moreau, N. (2002). Positive and normative analysis of tax policy:
Does the representation of the household decision process matter? Evidence for France. Paper presented
at the EEA’02 meeting in Venice.
Barmby, T., & Smith, N. (2001). Household labour supply in Britain and Denmark: Some interpretation
using a model of Pareto optimal behavior. Applied Economics, 33, 1109 1116.
Beblo, M. (2001). Die Freizeitlucke zwischen erwerbstatigen Muttern und Vatern Ein o konomischer
Erklarungsversuch mit Daten der deutschen Zeitbudgeterhebung 1991/92. In M. Ehling, J. Merz et al.
(Eds.), Zeitbudget in Deutschland Erfahrungsberichte der Wissenschaft. Wiesbaden: Statistisches
Bundesamt.
Beninger, D. (2000). Collective models: Introduction of the taxation. Mimeo, Mannheim: ZEW.
Beninger, D., Laisney, F., & Beblo, M. (2002). Welfare analysis of fiscal reforms: Does the representation
of the family decision process matter? Evidence for Germany. Mimeo, Mannheim: ZEW.
Beninger, D., Bargain, O., Beblo, M., Blundell, R., Carrasco, R., Chiuri, M. C., Laisney, F., Lechene, V.,
Longobardi, E., Myck, M., Moreau, N., Ruiz Castillo, J., & Vermeulen, F. (2006). Evaluating the move
to a linear tax system in Germany and other European countries: The choice of the representation of
household decision processes does matter. Review of Economics of the Household, 4, 159 180.
Bhattarai, K., & Whalley, J. (1997). Discreteness and the welfare cost of labor supply tax distortions. NBER
Working Paper 6280. Cambridge Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bingley, P., & Walker, I. (1997). The labour supply, unemployment, and participation of lone mothers in in
work transfer programs. Economic Journal, 107, 1375 1390.
Blundell, R., Duncan, A., & Meghir, C. (1998). Estimating labour supply responses using tax reforms.
Econometrica, 66, 827 861.
Blundell, R., Lechene, V., & Myck, M. (2002). Does the representation of family decision processes matter?
Collective decisions and fiscal reforms in the UK. Mimeo, London: IFS.
Blundell, R., Chiappori, P. A., Magnac, T., & Meghir, C. (2001). Collective labour supply: Heterogeneity
and non participation. IFS Working Paper WP01/19. London: IFS.
Browning, M., & Chiappori, P. A. (1998). Efficient intra household allocations: A general characterization
and empirical tests. Econometrica, 66, 1241 1278.
Browning, M., & Gørtz, M. (2005). Spending time and money within the household. Mimeo, Copenhagen:
CAM.
Browning, M.,& Lechene, V. (2001). Caring and sharing: Tests between alternative models of intra
household allocation. Oxford Economics Discussion Paper Series 70. Oxford: University of Oxford.
Browning, M., Chiappori, P. A., & Lechene, V. (2006). Collective and unitary models: A clarification.
Review of Economics of the Household, 4, 5 14.
Browning, M., Chiappori, P. A., & Lewbel, A. (2004). Estimating consumption economies of scale, adult
equivalence scales, and household bargaining power. Mimeo, Boston: Boston College.
Carrasco, R., & Ruiz Castillo, J. (2002). Does the representation of the family decision process matter? A
collective model of household labor supply for the evaluation of a personal tax reform in Spain. Mimeo,
Madrid: Universidad Carlos III.
Chiappori, P. A. (1988). Rational household labor supply. Econometrica, 56, 63 89.
Chiappori, P. A. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. Journal of Political Economy, 100, 437 467.
1 14
Chiappori, P. A., Fortin, B., & Lacroix, G. (2002). Marriage market, divorce legislation and household labor
supply. Journal of Political Economy, 110, 37 72.
Chiuri, M. C., & Longobardi, E. (2002). Welfare analysis of fiscal reforms in Europe: Does the repre
sentation of family decision processes matter? Evidence from Italy. Mimeo, Bari: University of Bari.
Dauphin, A., El Lahga, A.R., Fortin, B., & Lacroix, G. (2006). Choix de Consommation des Me´nages en Pr
e´sence de Plusieurs De´cideurs. Forthcoming in L’Actualite´ E´conomique.
Donni, O. (2003). Collective household labor supply: Non participation and income taxation. Journal of
Public Economics, 87, 1179 1198.
Donni, O. (2004). A note on the collective model of labor supply with domestic production. Mimeo, Cergy
Pontoise: Universite´ de Cergy Pontoise.
Fong, Y., & Zhang, J. (2001). The identication of unobservable independent and spousal leisure. Journal of
Political Economy, 109, 191 202.
Fortin, B., & Lacroix, G. (1997). A test of the neo classical and collective models of household labour
supply. Economic Journal, 107, 933 955.
Heckman, J., & Singer, B. (1984). A method for minimizing the impact of distributional assumptions in
econometric models of duration data. Econometrica, 52, 271 320.
Hoynes, H. (1996). Welfare transfers in two parent families: Labor supply and welfare participation under
AFDC UP. Econometrica, 64, 295 332.
Lewbel, A. (2000). Two stage least squares estimation of endogeneous sample selection models. Mimeo,
Boston: Boston College.
Lundberg, S., Pollak, R., Wales, T. (1997). Do husbands and wives pool their resources? Evidence from the
UK child benefit. Journal of Human Resources, 32, 463 480.
Manser, M., & Brown, M. (1980). Marriage and household decision making: A bargaining analysis.
International Economic Review, 21, 31 44.
Mas Colell, A., Whinston, M., & Green, J. (1995). Microeconomic theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McFadden, D., & Train, K. (2000). Mixed MNL models of discrete response. Journal of Applied Econo
metrics, 15, 447 470.
Moreau, N., & Donni, O. (2002). Une Estimation d’un Mode`le Collectif d’Offre de Travail avec Taxation.
Annales d’E´conomie et de Statistique, 65, 55 83.
Myck, M., Bargain, O., Beblo, M., Beninger, D., Blundell, R., Carrasco, R., Chiuri, M.C., Laisney, F.,
Lechene, V., Longobardi, E., Moreau, N., Ruiz Castillo, J., & Vermeulen, F. (2006). Who receives the
money matters: Simulating the working familiesa tax credit in the UK and some European tax reforms.
Review of Economics of the Household, 4, 129 158.
Small, K., & Rosen, S. (1981). Applied welfare economics with discrete choice models. Econometrica, 49,
105 130.
Van Soest, A. (1995). Structural models of family labor supply: A discrete choice approach. Journal of
Human Resources, 30, 63 88.
Vermeulen, F. (2002). Where does the unitary model go wrong? Simulating tax reforms by means of unitary
and collective labour supply models. The case for Belgium. Mimeo, Leuven: University of Leuven.
Vermeulen, F. (2005). And the winner is ... an empirical evaluation of unitary and collective labour supply
models. Empirical Economics, 30, 711 734.
1 15
